Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI)
US House of representatives
It was only a matter time it appears. After months of silence members of Congress, a member of the US House of Representatives itself publicly inserted into the debate on two controversial studies that have shown how to make the avian flu H5N1 transmissible between mammals.
Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI), a former head of the House committees on science and justice, and is currently Vice Chairman of the House Committee on Science, Space, and technology, last week sent a "letter made -Find" White House science adviser John Holdren, asking pointed questions about how the US government has treated the controversy and whether it would have funded the two flu studies .
"the answer [Obama] administration appeared ad hoc, delayed and inadequate," said the letter, which was reported by Chemical & Engineering News . And a recent request an advisory board of the government to conduct a second review of two studies "only adds to the confusion," Sensenbrenner wrote. "An ad hoc approach is insufficient to balance the priorities of public health and the free flow of academic ideas. "
Washington insiders were somewhat surprised by the lack of public reaction to the Congress controversy H5N1. Similar recent controversies such as the 05 debate over the publication by Science a document detailing the reconstruction of the influenza virus that caused the 1918 pandemic, sparked criticism from some members of Congress, and even an effort, ultimately unsuccessful account, adopt a resolution opposing publication of this document. this time, however, key legislators and their staff members appeared content to receive private briefings on the issue of senior managers at the National Institutes of Health ( NIH) and its parent agency, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
Observers debate about the flu also noted that Holdren has not played a prominent role in the public debate on the issue; his predecessor in the presidency of George W. Bush, the late John Marburger, took a more public role to explain and discuss biosafety policies of the government. This time, however, other staff-Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases of the NIH, HHS official and Amy Patterson were the public face of the Obama administration. By sending a letter to Holdren, however, Sensenbrenner may focus on scientific adviser to the president.
The full text of the Sensenbrenner letter follows:
March 1, 2012
The Honourable John P. Holdren
Office of Science Policy and technological
Executive Office of the President
725 17th Street, Room 5228
Washington, DC 20502Dear Dr. Holdren:
last summer, two research teams funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) genetically virus H5N1 bird flu making it capable of respiratory transmission between ferrets, as amended, and probably between humans. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) recommended that newspapers not to publish details of the search because he felt that the benefits outweighed the risk that terrorist groups could use it as a recipe to create a biological weapon. Yesterday, the NIH announced that it will ask the NSABB to meet to review new versions of both studies.
The specter of a deadly flu pandemic is really scary. While explaining its recommendation, the NSABB asked, "Could this knowledge in the hands of malicious individuals, organizations or governments to allow the construction of a virus genetically modified influenza capable of causing a pandemic with a higher mortality than the epidemic of "Spanish flu" of 1918? "
The risk of biological attack is large enough that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton took the unusual step of traveling to Geneva to meet the Convention on Biological Weapons UN Review 7 December 2011. Clinton warned that the threat of biological diversity weapons could no longer be ignored and that "there are warning signs," including "evidence in Afghanistan ... al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula made a call to arms for, and I quote-'brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to develop a weapon of mass destruction. "
the outstanding question is why the least NSABB recommended against publication that is why this research was done at all. I place great importance on the open scientific research and the free flow of ideas, the principles are really the foundation of scientific innovation and advancement, but in this case, the researchers created an organization that, if released, could kill millions of people worldwide. At a time when malicious actors are actively seeking biological weapons of mass destruction, scientists have managed to create an organization that we all prayed nature would not.
The management response appeared ad hoc, delayed and inadequate. NSABB against the recommendation of the publication came only after the research was completed and submitted for publication. According to Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, the risks to the health and safety of the H5N1 research "did not hit the radar screen", or in research institutions home or during multilayer review system of the NIH.
Underscoring the danger, Dr. William Schaffner, professor and chair of the Department of Preventive Medicine at the School of Medicine at Vanderbilt University, argued that it could be too late to control research . Dr. Schaffner said, "We have a pyramid of more and more people who understand these data, the pyramid will continue to grow over time"
recent request NIH that the NSABB. reconsider its recommendation only adds to the confusion. an ad hoc approach is insufficient to balance the priorities of public health and the free movement of academic ideas. in addition, if the circumstances are a legitimate threat to global health, government needs an evaluation system that is able to identify and prevent the spread of dangerous search, ideally before the search is performed. Broad supervision is necessary both nationally and worldwide by objective scientific with expertise in relevant fields
please answer the following questions before March 31, 2012.
1. How NSABB weigh the risks and potential benefits of dual use research? When is pleading against the publication?
2. What systems exist to identify and, where appropriate, the early control of dual-use research?
3. Science editor Bruce Alberts said he takes the NSABB recommendations seriously and was willing to withhold information, but only if the government creates a system to provide the missing information legitimate scientists who need them. What is the current system of government for the distribution of legitimate dual-use research in the world? How is the system implemented from the articles in question?
4. Does the NIH review system to identify research potentially dangerous dual-use? Why has it failed to identify research on bird flu until it was completed and submitted for publication?
Thank you for attention to this issue and look forward to your response.
Sincerely,
SENSENBRENNER F. JAMES, JR.
Vice President, the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
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