in the eye of the storm. Flu researcher Ron Fouchier has been proactive in discussing the nature and benefits of the research.
Dirk-Jan Visser
In a statement released today on the websites of Nature and science a group of 39 influenza researchers announced a moratorium of two months on studies that avian H5N1 strain of the flu more transmissible between mammals. The moratorium is to allow time for an international debate on such research, some people say has the potential to help bioterrorism.
Science Insider spoke to Ron Fouchier of Erasmus MC in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, who made one of two studies that triggered international debate. (The document is currently in review Science .) The responses of Fouchier were translated from Dutch and edited for clarity and brevity.
Q: Who took the initiative of this ad
RF: The initiative came from Adolfo García-Sastre [an influenza researcher at Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York City who has a grant from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) that funded Fouchier's study] Yoshihiro Kawaoka [dontleH5N1étudedanslapresseà Nature , was also considered by the National Advisory Council of the US science for biosecurity (NSABB)] and myself. We discussed with a group of about 10 scientists doing similar studies them; so we asked for another 30 or flu researchers who do not work on these studies, but could do if they wanted to sign. They all agreed wholeheartedly. It is therefore not a Fouchier show. It is an initiative that is supported very broadly.
Q: Why did you take this step now
RF: We have been informed by various organizations, and of course we have followed the press coverage and political debates. We had the impression, based partly on the advice of others, it would be reasonable to announce a moratorium.
Q: Which third party
R.F :. The agencies that fund our research, but also governments that we are talking to. As happens when it makes sense to pause, to give the infectious diseases field time to think about and talk about how to handle this type of research in the future. This research offers opportunities and challenges, and governments and organizations need time to react.
Q: Did you do this because if you do not do that, governments could move to stop the search
RF: The debate is so controversial that we can not rule that out. We prefer to have everyone take a break to think carefully about how to handle this.
Q: But have you received clear signals that there could be a ban of some sort
RF: We don ' have no clear signals that something will happen, but you get the signals in the press, experts and consultants, and these signals reach both governments. We see articles in Michael Osterholm [director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota, and an influenza expert], and people like Laurie Garrett, Pulitzer Prize [and a Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations]. And then there are the biosafety experts at the University of Pittsburgh, as Thomas Inglesby. ... And [smallpox eradication leader] D. A. Henderson was very vocal. All these people can have a strong impact on the White House and elsewhere.
Q: How do you feel about the moratorium you
R.F:. It is a pity that it should get there. I would have preferred if it has not caused so much controversy, but it has happened and we can not change that. So I think it is the right step to make. It is comparable to what happened in 1975 at the Asilomar Conference. But I think this has been driven more by the scientists themselves; this time is mostly public controversies that animate.
Q: Do you have ideas on how the debate on these studies should be organized and who should participate
RF: I think it should be a series of debates. A couple is already on track. As we said in our statement, a meeting will be organized in the next two weeks, I hope, will include the participation of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the US government. The [American Society for Microbiology] held a plenary meeting at its biodefense meeting next month. The New York Academy of Sciences meeting. People need to talk, and infectious disease specialists need to take the microphone and explain why this research is important and how you can do it safely.
Q: Does the extent of the controversy that has surprised you? If you planned this when you talked about the study at a meeting in Malta in September
RF: When we presented this, of course we expected there would be some agitation, and we would have to explain to the public and the press why we do this and how you can do it safely.
I think we did very well in the Netherlands. We were very proactive; before we submitted the paper for publication, we informed all competent authorities, so they knew what was going on and had time to prepare, and when the story began to tour in uS media, we spent three days talking to newspapers, TV, and radio. And pinched the debate in the bud. In the US, this has not occurred. And the people who are most vocal in the press are experts in biosafety. It is a pity that so few people in the field of flu jumped in front of cameras, particularly in the US
Q: Does the NSABB recommendations take you by surprise
RF: Absolutely. It was something that was unprecedented and something I did not count at all.
NSABB said the risks outweigh the benefits, and now many people say: In this case, you should not do this research at all. This is a very logical answer. But the infectious disease community does not agree with NSABB about it. NSABB that should better explain what the risks are exactly. How bioterrorism have we seen in the past? What are the chances that bioterrorist will recreate these viruses? And is it true that the publication of this research would bioterrorist or rogue nations an advantage? That's what I like to hear the NSABB.
Q: You think he does not give them an advantage
RF: No, because bioterrorist can not make this virus, it is too complex, it takes a lot of expertise. And rogue nations that have the ability to do it, do not need our information. So I do not think they will benefit from this information at all. Meanwhile, NSABB gives very little credit to the benefits of public health, while the community of the whole flu crying how important this is. For them, the balance of risks and benefits is very different from the NSABB.
Q: But NSABB several researchers of infectious diseases among its members, including Osterholm, a flu expert himself. And they hired Robert Webster, a flu researcher at St. Jude Children's Hospital in Memphis, as a special adviser.
R.F :. The question is whether it was enough or if they would have had to ask several influenza experts. If they had asked someone like Peter Palese of the Mount Sinai School of Medicine, you would have had a very different answer. If you read his piece in Nature -I think he was quite right.
Osterholm, in his article [published yesterday with Henderson] in Science has a very fatalistic attitude. He says countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East are unable to do surveillance, so they do not need data from our paper. It's too fatalistic. It would be better to say: How can we help these countries to develop a decent surveillance system? Osterholm also said the data make no difference to the development of vaccines. Which is really based on anything. So if this is the specialist of influenza within NSABB, I would like to see someone with a more positive attitude.
Q: How moratorium affect search to your own laboratory
RF: Of course we were working to confirm which mutations cause the virus become transmissible by aerosol. This will stop now; we're almost done with this, but not quite. We worked to find out what biological properties of the virus are associated with mutations that we found. The biological properties of the virus are far more important than the changes themselves.
Q: What are the biological properties tell you
RF: In an article Current Opinion in Virology we said that we thought there were a number of things that could make a virus transmissible bird flu among mammals. At the time, that was purely hypothetical. We said the virus probably has to do better in the upper respiratory tract that deep inside the lungs; it must bind to certain receptors in mammals; it must reproduce in large quantities, to increase the chances of transmission; it must be stable in the small droplets, and so on.
Now that we have these mutations, we can examine each of these steps to see if they occur. And you will see that for each step, there are several options, the most possible mutations that only those we have found so far. So this is very important.
Something else that needs to happen is to assess existing vaccines and antiviral drugs. So far we have only looked at in vitro if the characteristics of these viruses represent existing vaccine strains, and if the virus is susceptible to antiviral drugs. We have not tried in our animal model.
Q: You also want to repeat the experiments with more H5N1 strains
R.F :. Yes. We did it with a genetic lineage of H5N1. The question is whether all the lines can become aerosol-transmissible. If they can not, if it is just that line, maybe you can focus on the region where it comes and try to stop H5N1 outbreaks there to prevent a pandemic. If this can happen anywhere, you have to work everywhere.
Q: Would you also do similar studies in other strains of avian influenza, including H7N7?
R.F :. This is certainly something we would like to do in the long term. But it has a much lower priority because we do not see the H7N7 outbreak at the moment, and we're certainly not going to do it soon; I do not think that would be wise.
Q: Have you had requests from other laboratories to share the virus that you created
R.F :. Not explicitly. Everyone understands that this is not the right time to ask.
Q: But if they ask, what would you
RF: I have an agreement with our lender, NIAID, if such requests were made, I'll discuss it with them. So I can not decide myself.
Q: Andrew Pekosz recently said Science a moratorium would be especially harmful to young scientists who do the work of actual laboratory. Do you see that as a problem?
R.F :. I think this is a small problem compared with other issues. I have a postdoc here Sander Herfst, who worked hard on this for 4 years and for which a tremendous breakthrough in his career is on hold. But these are individual cases. I think the impact of NSABB recommendations for life sciences are much more important. If we get tough new guidelines for the screening of proposals, I think that could hinder the life sciences for years.
Q: In a policy forum that you co-wrote and which was published yesterday on Science Web site of the, you say you can not promise always keep the key details of your paper secret. Under what circumstances you decide to reveal them?
R.F :. Well, Science and we said that we will try to follow the recommendations of the NSABB. The US government is now looking for a mechanism to share key information with people who have a legitimate need to see, but it is far from easy; there are all sorts of legal questions. So that this mechanism will look like and that this information can be shared with is very clear.
Meanwhile, the WHO said: This research is super important, but it is equally important that the data is shared, or it could mean the end of Pandemic preparation influenza framework . And rightly so, because this part is very important for the monitoring systems. Suppose fall if, for any reason this manuscript could not be shared with certain people. Then we have to discuss with the government of the United States and WHO. This could occur. Again, you need to weigh the benefits and risks.
Moreover, as researchers, we work very closely with people in Indonesia. It would be very unwise for us not to share our results with our close collaborators.
Q: So if researchers are not approved for use of the sharing mechanism ...
RF: I do not know who will be driving this mechanism and what arguments would be to deny access to certain people. But if the result is that I can not share the details with my staff, I have a problem. This kind of situation can occur. So we will give the US government and the NSABB the chance to put a mechanism in place, and we expect that they come with. But we can not say now that we will never share this information.
Q: When do you think you will know more about this mechanism and the publication of your article
RF: The previous deadline was the end of January, but from what I heard, the US government has requested an extension of 4 weeks. So I think it will be the end of February.
Q: Are you in contact with Yoshihiro Kawaoka
R.F :. on a daily basis.
Q: You've been all over the news while remaining completely silent. Would not you have preferred to make the case for these studies together?
R.F :. We both made a conscious choice to do what we did. I feel the responsibility to defend my point of view and respond to these media calls. And of course, I made that decision when I decided to go to Malta. He did not talk about his work at a meeting, so what he did is still under wraps in this paper Nature . And I can understand his decision; he has two laboratories to perform, one in Japan and one in the US Frankly, the last 3 months, I only politics, the press, and things like that fact. I have more time to my knowledge.
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