Members of an advisory council biosecurity of the US government offer a range of reactions the news they are invited to take a second look at two controversial studies of influenza. Some have not spoken publicly about the issue, which sparked a global debate on biosafety in relation to scientific freedom. And many skeptics say that the new magazine will reverse their opposition to fully publish the methods and results of the two experiments.
The following comments come after months of rapid-fire developments in the search for the H5N1 flu controversy. It started last year when the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) recommended that two scientific teams remove key details of the documents submitted to Science and Nature that describe how researchers did the bird flu H5N1 more transmissible between mammals, may provide a plan for starting a pandemic. The risks posed by the research outweigh the potential benefits, 23 voting members of the committee have unanimously concluded, after what they described as hundreds of hours of discussion. The voting members of NSABB are mostly scientists from a wide range of disciplines and institutions, including universities and companies. (There are also 18 non ex-officio voting members of federal agencies.)
The researchers and journals have agreed to follow the recommendation of NSABB, provided that the US government comes with a mechanism to share these details with bona good researchers and experts in public health. The case has attracted much criticism, however, with some scientists saying the redactions went too far, and other supporting research should not have been carried out first.
Then, in January, influenza researchers, including leaders of the two research teams, Ron Fouchier of Erasmus Medical College in the Netherlands and Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin, Madison announced 60-day moratorium on many types of studies on the virus. This moratorium, currently set to expire March 20, was designed to ease tensions and public concerns, and allow time for the international discussion of the issue.
Last month, the World Health Organization (WHO) convened a group mainly composed of experts from the flu for two days in Geneva to discuss the studies. Many of the 22 people at the WHO meeting, however, rejected the findings of NSABB and argued that the documents should be published in full. This meeting included talks by Fouchier and Kawaoka, who presented "new data" and, in the case of Fouchier, "clarified the oldest data," according to Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of the National Institute of Allergy health and infectious diseases, which funded both studies. Fauci, who attended the meeting in Geneva, says the group also asked the researchers to revise and resubmit their manuscripts NSABB.
Fauci announced that the US government asked NSABB to review new manuscripts, February 29 during a round table in the early morning on the H5N1 controversy organized by the American Society for Microbiology ( ASM) in Washington, DC NSABB "needs a chance to see all the data that we saw in Geneva ... and a little time to talk," said Fauci science Insider .
The reconsideration request apparently took many members NSABB and Washington policy makers by surprise. Sources familiar with the plan say the NSABB meeting tentatively scheduled for later this month could last two days. He also hopes to include presentations by Fouchier and Kawaoka, so the NSABB members could speak to them "to face-off", unlike teleconferences that characterize most previous discussions studies of influenza.
President NSABB Acting Paul Keim of Northern Arizona University in Flagstaff, who moderated the discussion ASM, declined to speculate on how the panel might display the new versions of both studies. But " NSABB recommendations can clearly be modified in the future, "said Keim." We can not go back and change this if this is the best course of action. "
the meeting of the ASM also included a detailed presentation by Fouchier of transmission and apparently fired fatality data from its Science manuscript. in general, Fouchier said the data showed that the version of the H5N1 virus has been designed, however press reports, non-lethal when inhaled by the animals and do not spread "like wildfire" in the air. (Kawaoka had publicly said earlier that his version of the transmitted virus mammal was not lethal in ferrets.)
Following the meeting of the ASM Science Insider has attempted to contact all 23 voting members of the NSABB. Seven have agreed to e-mail, interviews, with several noting that they spoke for themselves, not NSABB phone or in person. They included:
David Relman Professor of Microbiology and Immunology and Medicine, School of Medicine, Stanford University, Stanford, California
"my bottom line: Fouchier began with a very disturbing and sometimes fatal virus to humans and appears to have improved its transmissibility through breathing Nothing in these last days change these facts, [and] not my assessment. risk-benefit ratio. for me, the most important question about [Fouchier's] transmissibility in the ferret model is the direct comparison of the starting strain (wild-type H5N1) and the strain (s) engineering. and the latter is / are transmitted via [respiratory] route than the first. " Kawaoka of the document "has also provided clear guidance on how to improve the transmissibility of H5N1," he writes, and other issues, such as virulence and lethality, were less important.
Susan Ehrlich, retired judge and assistant professor, Department of Microbiology and Immunology, University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston
"I heard nothing new so much as a different focus at the meeting of ASM could be expected, however, for two reasons: hundreds NSABB members, especially those who working group members have spent hours discussing these manuscripts after. having considered, and it was a public meeting. and of course, none of us has yet seen the revised manuscripts, I have no doubt will be examined with a completely open mind, remembering that the first thought of each of us is that scientific research should be free and complete statement, a point highlighted in each of several reports of NSABB and more specifically in the framework proposed in June 07 to monitor the dual use of life sciences research: strategies to minimize the potential misuse of research information. "
" keeping in mind that I did not read the revised manuscripts, I have some concerns. Dr. Fouchier said the ferret response during the meeting, but the biggest problem is the transmissibility. H5N1 is certainly a dangerous virus, and it has now been made more. Its host range has been extended. search on the modified virus was performed at the same level of biosecurity that research on the virus from the mother. These concerns are at the base of my thoughts on the communication of this research in the context of the responsibility of the NSABB the public should have an accident (bioerror) or a deliberate misuse of incident (bioterrorism), and so i want to continue to proceed with caution. "
Stanley Lemon, Professor of medicine and Microbiology and immunology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
"the main concern was the acquisition of the virus by aerosol transmission capacity in a mammal. "
Lynn Enquist, professor and chair, Department of Molecular Biology, Princeton University, New Jersey
" My message to take away the House. The two groups have experiences that are on the "seven experiments of concern" described in detail in the report Fink [lerapportde03nationalAcademies Biotechnology Research in the Age of Terrorism: Confronting the Dual Use Dilemma ] and our own recommendations. they not only changed the host range of a dangerous pathogen, they also changed its mode of transmission. "
" All other differences in methods or new work or clarified on virulence in ferrets, does nothing to change those facts. "
" While there is no doubt that the work must be done to study the H5N1 virus, and the debate to date has shown the need for further work is, these new derivatives are new entities with unknown consequences if they move into the ecosystem. "
" How does it work on these new agents do? How many laboratories should work along these directions? How should this work will now be communicated and in the future? These are some of the central issues in my opinion. "
"The NSABB should not make these decisions or to review details of the science. We have called attention to the fact that these experiences are looking for dual-use concern."
Arturo Casadevall, chair, Division of Infectious Diseases, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, New York, New York
Casadevall noted that he went into the original NSABB discussions of both documents thinking 'science should be free and nothing should be redacted, but then it became clear to me that there was almost no public good in [publishing] . details "Now he says:" I'll go to the next meeting with an open mind and listen to all this process is supposed to be deliberative and this process is one in which you can think through it and change your mind. .. "
But" the key issue for me is the transmissibility. unless Ron [Fouchier] stands up and he says it is not transmissible from mammal, "Casadevall is unlikely to reverse its opposition to the complete publication. "Having transmissibility is a new feature for H5N1," he added, noting that "this virus has the ability to recombine and we have no idea what will come out." He sees the virulence and lethality of new viruses designed as "mini-debates" that are less important. "We must be very careful. We are dealing with an organization that we know can cause pandemics and can kill many people. And we know we do not have immunity to H5. I recommend caution. "Casadevall also noted that" I am from Cuba. I know something about redaction. "
Michael Osterholm, director of the Minnesota Center of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities
"the information I saw [on 29 February] nothing changed the underlying issue of concern for NSABB, and that was the question of transmissibility. broaden the host range of a dangerous pathogen is one of anything [seven types of experiments identified as raising dual use concerns by the Fink Report]. ... I did not see that fundamentally changes nothing about the NSABB position. ... I am very confident that the criteria that we used for calling for the drafting of this document based on the question of transmissibility was simple and I am not convinced that the more conversation face-to-face would make a difference. "
Michael Imperiale, Professor, Department of Microbiology and immunology, University of Michigan Medical School, Ann Arbor.
"What Ron [Fouchier] is saying now is not what was in the paper. We were led to believe by the paper that aerosol transmission is also deadly." it also said it was news to him that the mutated virus does not spread between ferrets through aerosol as easily as seasonal strains, as Fouchier showed at the meeting of the ASM "This has not really come to me in the newspaper, "he said. "I do not see this kind of comparison."
Again, it is uncertain of the new information will influence his thinking about drafting. "Based on the bare minimal facts, from what I ' heard Fouchier Wednesday, I'm not sure it would be serious. The lethality in ferrets is the same as the starting virus and now it can be transmitted. "Specifically, noted Imperiale :." If the virus from H5N1 is injected intratracheally in ferrets, it kills What [Fouchier's] does is modified so that it is more fecal-oral spread, but aerosol it injects that intratracheal, and it kills. . So it is just as lethal, more now it can be spread by aerosol. You have a virus that kills X percent of humans it infects. based on the ferret data, we would expect to kill same exact percent of men, and now it can be transmitted from human to human. Obviously, I have to see this revised document, but I do not know that this changes anything. "
Imperiale said, in the end, there's just too much uncertainty to take the risk of publishing the details of the experiments. "given the uncertainty, I say go with the precautionary principle. And you wait until you can get rid of this uncertainty. If you deleted, n is not a permanent action. If you leave out is permanent. "
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