Four articles published today in the online, open access journal MBIO offer vast prospects biocontainment facilities that researchers should use to work with the bird flu virus that can transmit in mammals.
The controversy over two laboratory versions due to the H5N1 flu that for the first time can transmit in mammals. The studies, conducted with ferrets, led the National Scientific Advisory Council of the US Government for Biosecurity (NSABB) to recommend in December that documents describing experiences redact details to prevent information helping bioterrorism. The opinion of NSABB also triggered intense debate as to whether the work with these viruses should occur at biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) labs, as was done by the two groups that made the viruses, or even more secure BSL-4 laboratories.
A preview opening, co-written by an NSABB member and editor MBIO Arturo Casadevall notes that raising the level of containment has a difficult compromise: Additional measures to protect the company could make it more vulnerable because "the critical experimental work will not be done simply because BSL-4 facilities are few and already engaged in research with many other pathogens."
This perspective argues that "the heart of controversy "is the alleged fatality rate of H5N1. According to the World health Organization, nearly 60% of the 0 confirmed cases of H5N1 have resulted in death. But many researchers noted that this probably overestimates the true fatality rate as many subclinical cases go unnoticed. in another article, Lisa Murillo of theoretical biology and biophysics Group at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico argues that because of the confusion about the case fatality rate "it would be useful to err on the side of caution. "
A separate article co-written by Michael Imperiale NSABB member of the University of Michigan Medical School in Ann Arbor similar grows following the precautionary principle and using BSL-4, since there are many unknowns, including the reliability of the ferret model. This perspective points out that the level of biocontainment may change if more information comes later suggested that these viruses are not as dangerous as feared. "It's almost hard to believe today that cloning simplex virus thymidine kinase gene of herpes in 1979 was conducted BSL4 (or P4, as it was then called) confinement," the article notes, referring to a time when the first recombinant DNA experiments have emerged and have fueled similar security concerns. "This experience was considered high risk, but over time we came to understand that it is not, today, the same work would be done to BSL1 confinement"
Section. final Adolfo García-Sastre of Mount Sinai School of medicine in New York that supports BSL-3 provides sufficient security. García-Sastre argues that the H5N1 virus is sensitive to both antivirals and existing vaccines that would protect all laboratory workers were accidentally exposed. "the use of BSL4 containment would not reduce the risk of virus more than enhanced BSL3 containment release, but this would result in an unnecessary burden that would restrict research on H5N1 virus transmission fl uenza few facilities and considerably decrease the speed of research on this important pathogen, "he writes.
0 Komentar